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EVIDENCE ON SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: MAPPING THE 




Abstract:  Worldwide, almost 30% of professionally managed assets are invested in funds that 
use social performance as a screening or selection criteria.  Scholars have encouraged such 
investment by contending that social and financial gain are linked, but reviews of empirical 
research on the connection between social and financial performance have been inconclusive.  In 
fact, six of the most influential articles on the subject reach conflicting conclusions despite using 
the same sources of data and appearing in the same peer-reviewed journal.  Some scholars opine 
that no synthesis of these disparate findings is feasible, but we use new ideas from epistemology 
and statistics to show how it can be done.  We conclude that the interpretation of the evidence 
depends on empirical assumptions, particularly about the location of meaningful variance: 
differences between firms imply a positive relationship; but year-to-year differences within firm 







EVIDENCE ON SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: 
MAPPING THE EMPIRICAL GARDEN OF FORKING PATHS 
 
World-wide, more than $30 trillion, or almost 30% of professionally managed assets, are 
invested in funds that use sustainability, responsibility, or social impact as a screening or 
selection criteria (GSIA, 2019).  Some of these investors are surely motivated by altruism, but 
others hope that firms that do good will also do well for their portfolios.  Scholars and 
professional managers have encouraged such beliefs by contending that social and financial gain 
are linked, but reviews of empirical research on the connection between social and financial 
performance have been inconclusive.  Margolis and Walsh (2001) claim that most studies find a 
small positive relationship between social and financial performance, but they acknowledge that 
there is also a wide dispersion in results.  Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes (2003) also infer a 
generally positive connection, but contend that it may be contingent on the use of particular 
measures of financial performance.  Most recently, Michael Porter, Mark Kramer, and George 
Serafeim (2019) have argued that they believe no empirical study has found credible evidence of 
a relationship between social performance and “alpha” – a common measure of abnormal stock 
return.  Given that Porter, Kramer, and Serafeim have usually been enthusiastic champions of the 
potential for such a relationship, their skepticism carries particular weight. 
Many studies of the relationship between social performance (SP) and financial 
performance (FP) have used the same sources of data: social measures from research firm Kinder, 
Lydenberg and Domini (KLD) and financial data from Standards and Poor’s.  The most 
influential article of this group, Waddock & Graves (1997), was among the first to report results 
from a systematic quantitative study of the SP-FP relationship.  Using KLD and S&P data from 
1989-1991, they estimate a positive and significant relationship between social and financial 




related studies, but each began with different assumptions and ended with different conclusions 
(see Appendix 1).  In 2000, McWilliams and Siegel re-estimated the SP-FP relationship using a 
different specification, this time including Research and Development (R&D) expenditures as a 
control variable.  They found no association between social and financial performance.  In 2001, 
Hillman and Keim argued that KLD measures of social performance should be separated into two 
scales, one measuring social management and the other issue participation.  They found a 
positive association for the former, but a negative one for the latter.  Hull & Rothenberg (2008) 
extended previous research by arguing that the SP-FP relationship should be assumed to be 
moderated, not just mediated, by R&D expenditures.  Based on their new model specification, 
they conclude that social performance is linked to financial performance only for low R&D firms 
(Hull and Rothenberg, 2008). Barnett & Salomon (2012) argue that previous analyses had 
mistakenly assumed a linear association, when the real relationship might be curvilinear.  Based 
on their empirical model, they conclude that social performance is only financially beneficial for 
low and high performers.  Finally, Zhao and Murrell (2016) return to the original model of 
Waddock & Graves (1997) and retest it with updated and more expansive data.  They find an 
association between social performance and accounting measures of financial performance, but 
not with those based on market value.   
Together, these six articles have been cited more than ten thousand times, and their 
impact continues to grow.  Some scholars interpret them as providing definitive evidence with 
respect to a particular relationship, while others conclude that their mixed findings mean that no 
general interpretation is warranted (Aguinis and Glavas, 2012).  Some even despair of the 
possibility of ever reaching consensus on the proposed SP-FP link.  Writing more broadly about 
the empirical literature on social and financial performance, Rowley and Berman (2000: 401) 




and society field, rather than build understanding.”  They contend that it is “difficult to produce 
worthwhile comparisons across studies or generaliz[e] beyond the boundaries of a specific study 
(p. 397)”; they propose jettisoning the whole enterprise of large-scale quantitative analysis; and 
they instead encourage researchers to conduct detailed studies of possible specific connections 
(Rowley and Berman, 2000).  They do not indicate, however, how readers should form 
aggregated knowledge from such fragmented studies. 
In this article, we explore a new way to evaluate and combine research on the social-
financial performance link. We draw inspiration for our analysis from recent research in 
economics, political science and management (Simonsohn, Simmons et al., 2015, Durlauf, 
Navarro et al., 2016, King, Goldfarb et al., 2019).  This research highlights the importance of 
empirical assumptions in determining estimated effects, and it proposes various ways that the 
influence of these assumptions can be made more transparent to readers.  We demonstrate the 
usefulness of this approach by mapping the space of assumptions used in six influential articles in 
the Strategic Management Journal. 
 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF AGGREGATING EVIDENCE 
Most of what we think we know about business management derives from what we hear 
or read about the research of other scholars.  But how do we aggregate knowledge across 
different studies?  In the case of the link between social and financial performance, most previous 
research has relied on principles of meta-analysis.  Studies on a similar topic are collected and 
their reported coefficient estimates are combined to create an overall score.  This approach has a 
long and reputable history, but it also involves inherent weaknesses.  Broad analyses, such as 
Margolis & Walsh (2001), must lump together studies using different measures, scales, 




publication bias, because only certain findings may be selected by authors (or reviewers) for 
publication (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004).  Finally, meta-analyses may aggregate together studies 
that have been done correctly with those containing a critical flaw (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004).  
All of these points are particularly relevant for research on the social-financial performance link, 
where Waddock (2004: 5) admits that “parallel and sometimes confusing universes exist.” 
The six articles we consider in this study do not come from different universes.  They use 
the same data, similar measures, and are published in the same peer-reviewed journal.  Yet, they 
still result in “findings” that are hard to combine into a useful whole.  To learn from them, a 
reader must know that the estimates can be trusted and are sincere (Fricker, 2002; Wilholt, 2013).  
“Trust” means that the reader must think the author made the same empirical assumptions that the 
reader would have done had she conducted the study (Fricker, 2002; Wilholt, 2013).  “Sincere” 
means that the reported frequentist estimates1 would occur as predicted in repeated samples if the 
reported assumptions were used to guide the empirical analysis (Fricker, 2002; Hacking, 1965). 
Unfortunately, readers can rarely observe the assumptions that authors have made, and 
thus do not know how to use reported analysis (Longino, 1990).  Consider for example, a case 
where an author chooses to eliminate an extreme outlier from a data set.  The reader is unlikely 
even to know of this exclusion and less likely to be able to assess its justification.  Thus, the 
reader must trust that the author made the right choice.  Empirical research requires dozens or 
hundreds of such choices.  So many, in fact, that statisticians Andrew Gelman and Erick Loken 
liken the empirical process to a walk thorough a “garden of forking paths” (Gelman and Loken, 
2013).  Depending on the assumption/choice made at each fork, the researcher will exit the 
 
1 These are the most common estimates used in social science.  Developed by Fisher and Neyman & Pearson, they 
allow a prediction of how frequently an estimate will appear in identically created samples taken from the same 




“garden” at a different spot.  To know the implications of the final result, the reader must observe 
and agree with each choice, or trust presumptively that the author made the same choices the 
reader would have done (Fricker, 2002; Wilholt, 2013). 
The reader’s difficulty in assessing the validity of empirical findings is made more 
problematic by the need also to observe the timing of empirical choices. To properly conduct 
frequentist analysis, researchers must specify in advance their hypotheses, sampling plan, test 
procedure, inference rules and so on (Spanos, 2010).  If a hypothesis is formed after evidence is 
found, a process known as HARKing, then the test statistics do not accurately predict what 
estimates will be found in repeated samples (Simmons, Nelson et al., 2011).  This problem of the 
timing of selected assumptions is further complicated by the peer review process.  If journal 
reviewers select findings based on their outcomes, they may tend to select those results that are 
more counter-intuitive, and thereby implicitly endorse the use of inappropriate empirical 
assumptions (De Long and Lang, 1992).2   
Given uncertainty about the accuracy and robustness of coefficient estimates, how then 
can we readers make sense of the empirical evidence published in academic journals?  In recent 
years, many researchers have proposed that extensive replication of empirical findings could help 
clarify which studies provide “informative value” and which do not (Simonsohn, Nelson et al., 
2014, Bettis, Helfat et al., 2016).  Some have even argued that readers should defer making 
inferences from reported estimates until they have been confirmed by a large body of related 
analysis (Simmons, Nelson et al., 2011).  Unfortunately, this may entail a long wait.  Building up 
sufficient studies to allow a p-curve analysis would mean the publication of several exact 
 
2 It is possible that this phenomenon explains why the publication of Waddock & Graves’ (1997) positive 




replications from identical samples from the same population.  Under current publication norms, 
such replications are rarely conducted or published (Bettis, Ethiraj et al., 2016).3   
This problem of knowledge validation and aggregation is common to many areas of 
science, and scholars from several disciplines have begun to converge on a common proposal.  
They eschew individual replications or meta-analyses of existing results.  They instead suggest 
that scholars determine the set of assumptions used by a collection of studies and then map the 
connection between each element of this set and its associated estimate.  In economics, 
statistician Edward Leamer has long advocated creating large maps of possible relationships 
between assumptions and findings – a process he calls “extreme bounds analysis” (Leamer, 
1985).  In finance, Sal-i-Martin (1997) follows Leamer’s advice to investigate conflicting 
findings in macro-economics.  In political science, Durlauf, Navarro, and Rivers (2016) evaluate 
the literature on the effect of concealed-weapon permits on crime.  They determine the full set of 
assumptions used from previous studies and then estimate outcomes for all possible combinations 
of these assumptions.  In psychology, Simonsohn, Nelson, and Simmons (2015) suggest that 
scholars should estimate and report descriptive and inferential statistics on all reasonable 
specifications.  In management, King, Goldfarb and Simcoe (2019) argue that scholars should 
report maps connecting feasible assumptions and estimation outcomes. All of these scholars 
argue that maps of the connections between assumptions and estimates will aid readers in 
verifying and aggregating reported analyses. 
In this article, we bring these new methods to the question of a link between social and 
financial performance.  We know of no precedence for our study with respect to this connection.  
 




The closest precedent for the method of our analysis is Durlauf, Navarro, and Rivers (2016).  We 
augment their approach with mapping suggestions from King, Goldfarb and Simcoe (2019).   
Following precedent in the literature, we begin our analysis by identifying the space of 
assumptions implied by previous research.  We do not prioritize any particular set of assumptions 
or model specifications, but instead try to develop a feasible set of alternatives for evaluation.  
We then estimate all models based on these assumptions and report the results in two main ways.    
First, to aid inference by readers with strong priors4 about the correct models, we report 
“epistemic maps” connecting the full range of assumptions to their related estimates (see Figure 
2).  We also report maps where we hold constant a critical empirical assumption while allowing 
others to vary (see Figures 2-5).  Such maps allow readers to index from their assumptions to 
conditional estimations and to observe the reliability of these estimates.  For example, if a 
particular scholar believes that firm-level differences more accurately reflect the relationship 
between social and financial performance, she can constrain her consideration to the collection of 
models that include firm-level fixed effects.  She can then observe whether estimates from her 
preferred class of models vary with changes in other assumptions (i.e. controls, interactions, etc.). 
Second, to allow inference by readers with diffuse priors5 across different assumptions, 
we also use Bayesian analysis to calculate posterior probabilities6 for the entire set of models.  
This allows us to construct a probability-weighted average effect based on groups of models.  It 
also allows us to select, conditional on the assumption of diffuse priors, “best” models for 
inference.   
The set of assumptions used in previous studies 
 
4 Strong Priors: one’s defined beliefs on the ‘right’ set of assumptions prior to observing evidence. 
5 Diffuse Priors: equal beliefs prior to observing evidence.  In our case, this means that a person thinks all empirical 
assumptions in our set (and the resulting empirical models) are equally likely to be the “right” ones before they 
observe the evidence. 




To create our map of the connection between empirical assumptions and estimations, we 
reviewed the six highly-influential studies identified in Appendix 1.  We determine the range of 
assumptions used or implied.  Doing so allows us to consider the main areas of debate in the 
literature. For example, should the relationship between social and financial performance be 
specified as linear or quadratic?  Is the effect moderated or mediated by other variables?  Should 
firms be compared to each other, or should only within-firm variance be used in estimates?  What 
control variables should be included?  In total, we identified six main classes of assumptions used 
in these influential articles.  These influence measurement of outcome variables, measurement of 
predictor variables, functional relationships, level of informative variance, appropriate controls, 
and sample time-period (Figure 1). 
Assumptions about measurement of outcome variables 
Scholars differ on how financial performance should be measured.  Waddock and Graves 
(1997) choose to use accounting estimates of financial performance (e.g. return on assets), while 
other scholars chose to employ measures based on market value (Market Value Added, Market to 
Book, or Tobin’s Q).  This choice is based on assumptions about the nature of the relationship 
between social and financial performance.  For example, Hillman and Keim (2001) choose to use 
a measure of “market value added” because they expect social performance to influence long-
term firm value and intangible assets.  Other scholars, such as Barnett and Salomon (2012) 
choose to use accounting measures because they believed these are more informative.  Several 
scholars choose to evaluate both market and accounting measures.   
Assumptions about construction of predictor variables 
Scholars also differ on how independent variables should be measured.  All use data from 
Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini, but they aggregate these scores into scales in different ways.  




weight them accordingly.  Hull & Rothenberg (2008) assume that social issues with more 
subcategories are more important and weight these higher.  Hillman and Keim (2001) argue that a 
subset of measures should be combined to form an estimate of “social management” or “social 
issue participation”.  Barnett & Salomon (2012) choose to use unitary weights for all of the KLD 
measures. McWilliams and Siegel (2000) use a dummy variable capturing those firms with scores 
sufficiently high to allow them to appear, based on their KLD scores, in the Domini Social Index.   
Assumptions about functional relationships 
Scholars also differ in their assumptions about the relationship between social and 
financial performance.  Most assume that the relationship is linear, but Barnett and Salomon 
(2012) disagree.  Based on theories of stakeholder influence capacity, they hypothesize that the 
association will be curvilinear, and they specify this in a model with a quadratic form.  Hull and 
Rothenberg (2008) assume that the relationship is moderated by firm and industry attributes, 
which they assume are exogenously given.  Thus, they specify a model that includes interaction 
terms for both the Firm’s R&D intensity and the Industry’s Advertising Intensity.    
Assumptions about the level of informative variance 
Scholars also disagree about whether the relationship between social and financial 
performance can best be estimated by comparison across firms or by comparison of performance 
within a firm over time.  If firms are actively changing over the panel, one might expect that 
“within-firm variance” would allow accurate estimates.  However, if firms have largely reached 
equilibrium states, variance between firms may be more informative.  At issue is whether each 
firm should be allowed a separate and independent base level of performance, or a “fixed effect”.   
Assumptions about appropriate control variables 
The authors also use different assumptions about the need for control variables in their 




might influence both predictor and outcome variables.  As a result, they have specified models 
that include a set of control variables that consist of firm size (sales or employees) and risk 
(debt/assets).  McWilliams and Siegel (2000) make an impassioned argument for including both 
R&D and Advertising Intensity as control variables.  They contend that these attributes are 
known to influence financial performance and also may be associated with social performance.  If 
so, model specifications where they are left out might result in biased estimates of the 
relationship between social and financial performance.   
Sample time period 
All of the authors use different samples for their analysis.  These reflect assumptions 
about viable links between KLD and Compustat data as well as data availability at the time when 
the analysis was conducted.  These assumptions are not well documented in the six papers we 
evaluated, so we chose to substitute our own assumption.  We assume that the relationship should 
be evident in the entire panel of currently available data.  In future work, we plan to consider 
different time periods. 
The combined assumptions and implied model space 
Figure 1 shows the different assumptions that determined the model space we estimate.  It 
consists of possible combinations of the model elements described above.  For simplicity, we 
choose to remove some closely related choices.  Even so, the implied space of plausible models is 
quite large.  It is comprised of two outcome variables, four alternative ways to measure the 
predictor variable, three functional assumptions, two types of informative variance (between or 
within firm), and 96 alternative configurations of control variables.  A simple product of these 
options would imply 4,608 models, but some are not unique because models with moderating 
interactions should include certain other variables, and some variables, such as industry 




we have 3,200 distinct models of the relationship between social and financial performance (see 
Appendix 2 for the computation of the final model set). 
------------------------------------ 





Data Sources and Sample Creation 
KLD began collecting data on firm social and environmental dimensions in 1991, starting 
with an initial sample of 650 firms (mainly S&P 500 firms within the KLD 400 Social Index).  In 
1988, it increased the sample to the 1000 largest firms in the United States; and in 2013, KLD 
expanded their analysis to non-US companies. Across years, KLD dimensions expanded as well. 
It started with eight attributes, as investigated by Waddock and Graves (2007). For five of which 
(employee relations, product, community relations, environment and diversity), firms receive 
scores based on both their strengths and weaknesses (the score ranges from +1 to −1, where −1 
identifies an area of weakness, +1 an area of strength, and 0 captures a neutral score). For three 
attributes, firms receive scores indicating weaknesses only (i.e. South Africa, military and nuclear 
power).  Later, some attributes were removed from the KLD analysis (e.g., South Africa in 
1994); others moved and merged into new dimensions (e.g. in 2004, KLD moved the 
“Indigenous Peoples Relations Strength” from “Community” to “Human Rights”), while others 
were renamed and expanded (for instance, the “Other category” was renamed “Corporate 
Governance” in 2002). Currently, there are13 categories: firms receive scores for both strengths 
and weaknesses for seven (e.g., corporate governance and human rights) and weaknesses only for 




To measure each firm’s financial performance (FP), we obtained financial data from 
Compustat and CRSP data at Wharton’s WRDS data center.  These data provide us with all of 
our firm-level financial measures, along with the number of employees and industry affiliation, 
and industry level data such as advertising intensity.  To combine the two data sets we matched 
different types of information from the KLD and Compustat data.  KLD data includes name and 
stock ticker and some CUSIP numbers.  Compustat data includes name and CUSIP numbers and 
some ticker information.  Unfortunately, the two systems differ in how they update information 
as it changes over time.  Compustat backdates all changes, while KLD does not.  In addition, IDs 
are not always recorded identically across the two databases.  Thus, to match the two databases, 
we constructed a program that employed various alternatives for name and IDs.  Matches were 
ranked and then checked for accuracy by the researchers.  In total, we were able to match 5,986 
firms for 42,736 firm-year observations, between 1991 and 2015. As we explain below, this is 
not our final sample. 
 
Restricted and unrestricted samples 
As in every dataset, ours has a number of issues that require researcher judgement.  First, 
many of the observations in the sample are missing values.  Usually, this missing information 
relates to R&D expenditures or advertising.  To conduct our Bayesian analysis of model 
selection, we need to use a consistent sample across all of the models, but to do this, we must 
remove from analysis many firms.  To allow analysis while assuring robustness, we chose to 
create a “restricted” sample of observations that would be consistent across all specifications.  





In a very few cases, estimated measures were many standard deviations outside the norm.  
For example, our measure of return on assets contains a few observations with values below -
10,000. Given the median of ROA is 3.48 in the full sample, we decided to exclude observations 
above 500% and below -500% ROA. Likewise, we decided not to include observations where the 
reported R&D spending exceeded sales.  These observations tended to be for biotech innovation 
firms that had no products.   
To create our restricted sample, we first estimated all of the models and marked the 
sample with the least number of observations.  We then used these observations as our restricted 
sample of 15,066 observations.  This sample includes 2,024 firms, the average of which is 
observed over 8.6 years. 
 
Variable Construction 
Dependent variables. Prior research has used a range of accounting and market-based 
firm performance measurements. We select the common form of each type to analyze.  We 
calculate Return on Assets (ROA) as the net income divided by the total asset of the firm in a 
given year. We multiplied this raw value by 100 to obtain the percentage transformation. To 
calculate the Market to Book Ratio, we calculate the asset value of all shares divided by the sum 
of all book assets and liabilities.  Were we able to measure the replacement value of assets our 
measure would be the same as Tobin’s Q. 
Independent variables. We built four different scales of social performance using KLD 
data.  
The first one, W&G, uses the method proposed by Waddock and Graves (1997). Their 
scale is a weighted average score of eight KLD social rating dimensions (i.e., employee relations, 




military contracts, and South Africa). The weightings of these measures are based on expert 
opinion (see (Waddock and Graves, 1997) for details). 
H&R is constructed following the method proposed by Hull and Rothenberg (2008), 
which is based on Waddock and Graves (1997). They, however,  used a different weight system 
in which dimensions with sub-categories (e.g., environment) received “a disproportionally greater 
weight than those (e.g., tobacco) with only one subcategory” (Hull and Rothenberg, 2008: 784). 
Unfortunately, they do not specify the weighting system. Given this limitation, we use the five 
dimensions with sub-categories used by Waddock and Graves (1997) and added one more, 
corporate governance as “potential social concern” (Hull and Rothenberg, 2008: 784).  
H&K is based on the scale proposed by Hillman and Keim (2001) for stakeholder 
management. It is the sum of the strengths minus the sum of the weaknesses of five social rating 
dimensions (employee relations, diversity issues, product issues, community relations, and 
environmental issues).7  
B&S is based on a scale proposed by Barnett and Salomon (2012). As with the previous 
variables, it aggregates the strengths minus weaknesses.  Unlike the previous scales, it includes 
all thirteen KLD social performance criteria.  
To allow comparison of effect sizes, we normalize each of these scales so that they have 
unitary standard deviation. 
Moderating and Mediating Variables.  Both Hull and Rothenberg (2008) and McWilliams 
and Siegel (2000) argue that R&D spending moderates or mediates the relationship between 
social and financial performance.  To create R&D, we divide the firm’s annual R&D spending by 
its total sales in each year. 
 




Control variables. Following prior research, we include additional firm controls such as 
size, calculated by firm sales ($1M), risk, calculated as firm debt/asset ratio, industry advertising 
expenditure (adv).  We also calculate two sets of dummy variables to capture industry effects at 
SIC two-digit level and year effects. Because of multicollinearity, our models cannot include 
both industry dummies and industry advertising intensity (adv). Finally, we included lagged DVs 
in the control variable set.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the restricted sample of 15,066 observations. 
ROA and MTB have similar means, but quite different standard deviations variance. It is worth 
noticing that although all the SP independent variables have different means, they are highly 
correlated with each other, ranging from 0.95 to 0.99.   
------------------------------------ 




Following prior research, we estimate simple linear models, quadratic models, and models 
with moderating variables (R&D).  All three types of models are estimated with and without 
firm-level “fixed effects”.  The former models, which we will refer to as “OLS” models, estimate 
the relationship between SP and FP using both within firm and between firm variability.  The 
latter models, which we will refer to as “FE” models, estimate the relationship using only the 
inter-year variance of firms. For both estimations, we obtain robust standard errors.  
In total, the possible combinations of empirical assumptions result in 3,200 model specifications 




coefficients for all 3,200 models and stored the marginal effect of the SP coefficient at the mean, 
its standard error, its confidence interval, and the R2 of the estimated model.  We also store the 
log-likelihood of each model and the resulting Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) value. 8   
 
Graphing 
After running all of the models and storing their estimates, we used the STATA graphic 
interface to display the marginal effects of the SP coefficients. To ease the comparison across 
models and their interpretation, we divided the marginal effects of the independent variables at 
their mean by their standard errors (b/se, or the t-statistic). We also calculate the lower and upper 
bound of the 95% confident interval of the b/se for each model. To build the Figures 2-4, we 
apply different sorting orders for the b/se, DV, SP variables and the functional models. For 
instance, Figure 2 includes all the models and it simply sorted by the b/se of each model – from 
the largest value (on the left) to the smallest value (on the right). The continuous black line 
depicts the b/se, the gray area its 95% confident interval. Figure 2 is then divided by the DV and 
sorted by b/se as illustrated in figures 2a (DV=ROA) and 2b (DV=MTB). In addition, we mark 
six models estimated by the six papers in Appendix 1 by their b/se and confident interval with red 
dash lines (see the references of these models in the text box next to Figure 2b).  
 
Bayesian Model Selection and Averaging 
If researchers and readers have diffuse priors about the correct model to use as inference, 
they may choose to prioritize estimates from models that better fit the observed evidence.   
 





By Bayes Rule, the posterior probability of any model i, conditional on the observed 
evidence D, can be calculated as: 
 





        Eq. 1 
where there are 1 to n possible models of data.  Since we cannot observe the priors of readers 
with respect to a group of possible models, and because we are interested in providing 
information to those readers with equal priors, we assume that P(M𝑖) = c, and ∑ 𝑐
𝑛
𝑖  =  1. This 
means that equation 1 can be simplified to: 





         Eq. 2 
 







          Eq. 3 
 
and compute probabilities relative to a reference model r with the highest BIC.  If we compare all 





𝑖 .=1           Eq. 4 
 
Substituting into Equation 2, we can calculate the posterior probability of each model i. 
P(M𝑖| D)  =  
e−BIC𝑖/2
e−BIC𝑟/2
         Eq. 5 
The probability-weighted coefficient estimate B̅ can then be calculated using 









Assuming that the estimate variance s2 of each model is independent9, we can calculate the 
variance of this pooled coefficient estimate as: 









Figure 2 shows our estimates for all 3,200 models.  We divide these by the dependent 
variable, with Figure 2a showing estimates of ROA and Fig 2b showing estimates for MTB.  In 
both figures, we graph the t-statistic (B/SE), and the 95% confidence interval for the estimate.  
Any estimate where the shaded region does not include zero can be thought of as indicating a 
“significant” coefficient B were the estimate to come from a single, prespecified test.   
Both graphs show that if authors were to randomly select and prespecify one of 3,200 
models and then conduct a frequentist analysis of B, they would have the highest chance of 
concluding that they could reject H: B <0, a reasonable chance of concluding that they could not 
reject the NULL, H: B=0, and a smaller chance of concluding that they should reject H: B>0.  
For estimates with respect to MTB, the chances would be 47, 41, and 12%.  For ROA, the 
chances would be 50, 47, and 3%.  Thus, it appears that if one were to have priors that all models 
were equally valid, one would be very likely to “find” a positive relationship between social and 
financial performance.  It seems unsurprising then, that previous summaries of research have 
concluded that most studies find evidence of a positive and significant result. 
------------------------------------ 




9 This is a strong assumption.  In future work, we plan to use a more accurate Monte Carlo analysis to construct the 




Figure 2 also indicates which estimates come from models used by the six previous 
studies in Appendix 1.  These estimates do not represent exact replications of these previous 
papers, because our sample differs from previous studies.  They represent what those authors 
would have found had they had used our sample in their analysis.  Nevertheless, they seem to 
corroborate several previously reported estimates.   
Using the models proposed by two authors (W&G and H&R), we find a positive and 
“significant” relationship between their measure of social performance and ROA.  Consistent 
with the results reported in Barnett & Salomon (2012), we find, when using their scale for social 
performance, a negative, but weak, average marginal relationship between SP and FP.  With 
respect to predictions of the Market to Book ratio, we corroborate Hillman & Keim’s estimate of 
a positive and significant relationship between social performance and MTB (see Figure 2b). 
Interestingly, the model proposed by McWilliams & Siegel (2000) results, in our sample, 
in a very different outcome than the one they report in their more limited sample.  Adding R&D 
to the model does not eliminate the significance of the SP-FP link.  Indeed, the M&S model 
delivers one of the strongest effects of all.  It is important to note, however, that we do not 
replicate exactly their measure of social performance.  They chose to use a binary variable 
indicating firms that had performed well-enough to be selected for the Domini Social Index.  We 
use a continuous measure which ranks all firms.   
 
What explains different results  
The effect of different scales for Social Performance  
The analysis reported in Figure 2a & b largely corroborates previously reported findings.  
It does not clarify why estimates differ so greatly across the previously published results.  To 




different implementations of SP measures.  For simplicity, we also consider only simple linear 
models.  As shown in Figures 3a and 3b, the result is insensitive to the specific scales employed 
by the authors.  For all measures, a simple OLS model will result in a beta estimate that is 
positive and significant.   
The inclusion of firm attributes, particularly firm size, reduces the size of the coefficient 
estimate.  Inclusion of a lagged dependent variable also reduces the scale of the estimated effect.  
Nevertheless, even models with a full complement of controls and lagged variables still results in 
an estimate of a significant and positive coefficient for ALL four different implementations of SP 
scales. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figures 3a and 3b about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
The effect of moderating and mediating effects on estimates for Social Performance 
As discussed earlier, several authors have proposed that R&D could influence OLS 
estimates of the SP-FP relationship.  Figure 4a and 4b show estimates for models mediated 
(including R&D as a control) and moderated by R&D (e.g including SP*R&D).  As before, the 
models are sorted by specification, SP scale, and the b/se or t-statistic (pos to neg).  As shown, 
mediation models result in an estimated of a positive and “significant” association.  All 
moderation models result in an estimate of B>0, but for models including a lagged dv, the 95% 
confidence interval of the t-statistic includes zero.  This is true whether the dependent variable is 
MTB or ROA.   
------------------------------------ 






Estimates based on within-firm variance (fixed effects models) 
Several authors have proposed that analysis of the SP-FP relationship should be done 
using only the variance within a firm’s history.  To do this, they specify a fixed effect (a dummy 
variable for each firm).  This means that all of the estimates for that firm are demeaned, so that 
any relationship is calculated only from year to year changes in social or financial performance.  
Barnett and Salomon (2012) further opine that the SP-FP relationship is not linear but curvilinear, 
and they specify a quadratic model.  As shown in Figures 5a and 5b, including fixed-effects has a 
dramatic impact on the estimated relationship.  Now, only 8 models (<1%) result in an estimate 
of B> 0, and none of these estimates pass traditional significance tests.  For the rest of these 
models, the estimate of B is negative, and for 60 (6% of the total) this estimate would 
traditionally be deemed negative and significant.  That is, authors conducting a single test using 
one of these models would conclude they should reject H: B>0. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figures 5a and 5b about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Finding the “Best” model 
Readers of this article will bring to it their own priors about which models are most 
appropriate.  Those who think estimates should be obtained by comparing market valuation 
(MTB) across firms may conclude that our results reveal that SP & FP are likely to be associated 
in future samples from the same population.  It should not matter whether or not these readers 
have strong priors about the correct way to create SP scales from KLD data or the specific 
controls that should be included.  What may change a reader’s inference, is a belief that models 
should include firm fixed effects.  Readers with this belief might infer that the association 




may even conclude that they should reject the hypothesis that there is a positive association 
between SP & FP. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
For those readers who are unsure which models are most appropriate (those with “diffuse 
priors”), they might prefer to observe the preponderance of evidence across all of the models, or 
to weight certain models with better “fit” as particularly useful for inference.  To aid these 
readers, we conducted further analysis by calculating how a reader with diffuse priors should 
assess the models based on their fit alone.  
Table 2 shows the models chosen to be “best” within a given group.  Models are grouped 
by different dependent variables, measures of social performance, and the inclusion of firm fixed 
effects (FE).  For each of these groups of models, the table reports the specification of the model 
with the highest posterior probability (i.e. the “best” model) and the coefficient estimates for 
B*SP for that model.  It also reports an estimate for B & s for all models in that group based on 
an average weighted by each model’s posterior probability P(M|E).   
As shown in Table 2, for each group of models (DV, IV, FE[0,1]), the same specifications  
had the highest posterior probability, regardless of the specific scale of SP chosen.  In all cases, 
these “best” models included a lagged DV, R&D ratio, and year fixed effects.  In some cases, 
best models included advertising, sales, or interaction terms.   
For OLS models predicting MTB, all of the “best” models resulted in coefficient 
estimates of a significant and positive relationship between SP & FP.  However, the results for all 
other “best” models were much more mixed.  Fixed effects models of MTB resulted in estimates 
of small B coefficients, and traditional significance tests would imply that the NULL hypothesis 




uncertain estimates for which the NULL hypothesis could not be rejected10.  Fixed effect 
predictions of ROA suggest the exact opposite.  Now, coefficient estimates were mostly negative. 
Weighted estimates of coefficients and standard errors closely matched those of the best 
models.  For every group, the best model made up more than 50% of the total probability weight 
of the average estimates.11  Thus, the results from probability weighted estimate closely match 
those of the “best” models. 
For those readers who are indifferent to the use of a particular scale, we also calculate the 
best model across all scales for the set of models (DV[MTB,ROA], FE([0,1]).  We find that the 
W&G scale or the H&K scale is usually selected as “best”.  We also find that the set of models 
point in opposite directions with respect to inference.  Models of MTB using OLS result in a B 
estimate are suggestive of a positive association between SP & FP.  Models of ROA using firm 
fixed effect result a B estimate suggestive of a negative association between SP & FP. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Our analysis results in coefficients of conflicting sign, scale, and significance.  How do 
we think it should be interpreted?  We know that it is not amenable to frequentist interpretations 
because we did not stipulate in advance a specific hypothesis, specification, and sampling plan.  
Nor can it be interpreted in a Bayesian manner because we have not attempted to estimate the 
probability of all other explanations of the observed data.  Thus, we can only engage in a kind of 
abduction, or conjecture making, about the patterns we see.  These “guesses” should then be 
subject to test. 
 
10 Earlier, we confirmed that Waddock & Graves’ (1997) model results in a positive and significant coefficient 
estimate.  Our Bayesian analysis suggest that their model delivers a stronger result than the “best” of the OLS 
models. 




Given our uncertainty about the data-generation process, no single model is highly 
informative. 
Our first observation is that specification choice determines the estimates obtained.  This 
means that depending on author priors and assumptions about the right specification, different 
results will be obtained.  It also means that less scrupulous scholars could search through a range 
of specifications to find any result they desired, positive, negative, or inconsequential.  Thus, 
readers should be cautious in extrapolating from any particular study. 
 
The effect of R&D remains unknown 
Based on prior work, we had expected that the addition of R&D as a control would reduce 
the size of the coefficient for SP.  We found a strong and robust effect in the opposite direction.  
Even specifications used by previous authors resulted in estimates of a positive coefficient for 
both R&D and for the interaction of R&D and SP.  One might conjecture that innovation is a 
complement to social performance.  It is also possible that the effect depends on some elements 
of the sample.  Older studies used a smaller group of firms and could observe them only over a 
short time period.  At best, our analysis suggests that the effect of R&D remains unknown. 
Among all firms, those with higher social performance tend to do well financially 
We observe that positive estimates for the SP-FP relationship arise from specifications 
where firm observations are pooled, while inconsequential or negative estimates arise from 
analysis that includes firm fixed effects.  In other words, across firms, there is an association 
between social performance and financial performance.  This association holds even when 
current financial performance is taken into account by adding a lagged term.  Thus, it appears that 
across all firms, there is a positive association between higher social performance than others and 




predictive statement.  It is tempting, however, to conjecture that all of the money flowing into 
SP-screened funds has raised the stock prices of the best rated firms.  
Year to year changes in performance are associated with negative or negligible impact. 
Models that include firm-level fixed effects result in coefficient estimates that are small or 
negative.  Why might this be?  One available explanation is that an increase in social 
performance involves cost, and this directly effects a firm’s ROA or market valuation.  But if 
improvement in Social Performance is costly, then why do some high SP firms seem to gain 
financially (as suggested by the pooled analysis)?  There are many possible explanations.  One 
might be that all of our specifications use the wrong lag structure and financial benefits appear 
only a year or more in the future.  Another might be that first movers gained capabilities that now 
allow them to reap financial gains.  Yet another explanation is that some attribute of social 
performance is highly correlated with unmeasured sectoral differences and it is these differences 
that are actually associated with financial performance.  In future work, we intend to explore 
these conjectures.   
Limitations 
Our study has many limitations, and should be extended in several ways.  First, we do not 
consider assumptions about identification, and thus we can say nothing about claims about causal 
connection.  Second, we do not consider a variety of other methods for conveying the mapped 
estimates.  We could, for example, simply post a look-up table so that any reader can connect her 
assumptions to the implied estimates.  Finally, we consider only a small subset of studies in 








At the highest level, our analysis shows how we can build shared understanding of 
important topics such as the link between social and financial performance.  We show that 
individual research estimates are sensitive to empirical assumptions, and thus any use of these 
estimates as a basis of understanding must be contingent on the reader’s acceptance of these 
assumptions.  To allow competent use of empirical analysis, researchers must be transparent 
about the choices they made as they walked through the empirical “garden of forking paths”. We 
also show how collections of assumptions can be mapped to a model space and associated with 
coefficient estimates: maps can be constructed to allow readers with strong priors to find a 
connection between favored assumptions and their linked estimates; Bayesian analysis can be 
used to allow readers with uncertain priors to pick a “best”, or “average” estimate for inference.  
In total, our analysis shows how even conflicting results can be aggregated into a synthesized 
understanding of what may be known and what surely remains unknown.   
With respect to the SP-FP link, we show that it is in fact possible to make “worthwhile 
comparisons” across studies, and that such research can be more than just a way to “legitimize 
the researcher and the business & society field” (Rowley and Berman, 2000).  We show how 
empirical studies, even those with opposing findings, can be integrated to improve our 
understanding. 
We hope that other researchers will adopt the methods used in this analysis.  Personally, 
we found it liberating to be free of the need to select and defend a particular set of assumptions 
and model specifications.  Rather than worry about selecting and defending a particular a 
particular path through the empirical “garden”, we could attempt to synthesize and aggregate 
previous studies.  We could enjoy the process of understanding assumptions made by prior 




defend a single “significant” coefficient estimate.  We had more fun, learned more, and held out 
some hope that we helped others to reach their own understanding as well – regardless of the 
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Figure 2. All 3,200 models sorted by b/se. Fig. 2a. Models with DV=ROA. 
  
 Fig. 2b. Models with DV=MTB 
Description of the models displayed in red dash lines.  
- “W&G model” refers to the model 1, Table 6 in Waddock & Graves 
(1997);  
- “M&S model” refers to the model 3, Table 2 in McWilliams & Siegel 
(2000);   
- “H&K model” to Table 2 in Hillman & Klein (2001);  
- “H&R model” to Model 3, Table 2 in Hull & Rothenberg (2008);  
- “B&S model” to Model 6, Table 2 in Barnett & Salomon (2012); and 
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Figure 3a: All linear OLS models with DV=ROA. Figure 3b: All linear OLS models with DV=MTB. 
  
Fig. 4a. Linear OLS models with RD as control and as moderator, DV=ROA Fig. 4b. Linear OLS models with RD as control and as moderator, DV=MTB 
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Fig. 5a. All linear FE models separated from all quadratic FE models. 
DV=ROA. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics.  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
         
              
ROA 4.237 12.128 -317.310 69.501 1                 
MTB 2.486 4.275 -247.956 139.612 0.112 1 
       
B&S -0.126 1.102 -5.220 7.228 0.072 0.054 1 
      
H&K 0.055 1.123 -4.414 7.504 0.084 0.052 0.950 1 
     
H&R -0.057 1.110 -4.553 7.036 0.080 0.048 0.985 0.968 1 
    
W&G 0.025 1.119 -4.509 7.294 0.083 0.056 0.958 0.995 0.965 1 
   
R&D 0.068 0.106 0 0.990 -0.323 0.177 0.053 0.050 0.037 0.058 1 
  
Size 6087.398 21730.540 -475.42 483521 0.058 -0.017 -0.007 0.078 0.040 0.059 -0.091 1 
 
Risk 0.187 0.197 0 2.095 -0.150 -0.162 -0.054 -0.043 -0.048 -0.045 -0.190 0.007 1 
Adv 4.363 1.344 0.188 7.660 0.053 0.059 0.031 0.066 0.055 0.054 0.035 0.115 -0.062 
              
Obs. 15,066 














Table 2: “Best” and probability-weighted estimates of SP/FP association. 
 
Model Group Specification of "best" model Estimates: "best" model Weighted Estimates 
DV SPmeasure Firm FE All Independent Variables B s T P(M|E) Bw sw TBw/Sw 
MTB(t+1) B&S No SP MTB(t) R&D risk adv year(fe) 0.071 0.022 3.19 66% 0.082 0.025 3.29 
MTB(t+1) H&K No SP MTB(t) R&D risk adv year(fe) 0.070 0.022 3.20 58% 0.081 0.035 2.33 
MTB(t+1) H&R No SP MTB(t) R&D risk adv year(fe) 0.062 0.022 2.79 76% 0.069 0.025 2.72 
MTB(t+1) W&G No SP MTB(t) R&D risk adv year(fe) 0.076 0.022 3.44 63% 0.087 0.028 3.14 
MTB(t+1) B&S Yes SP SPxRD MTB(t) R&D sales year(fe)  -0.006 0.051 -0.11 98% -0.006 0.051 -0.12 
MTB(t+1) H&K Yes SP SPxRD MTB(t) R&D sales year(fe)  0.016 0.051 0.31 99% 0.016 0.051 0.31 
MTB(t+1) H&R Yes SP SPxRD MTB(t) R&D sales year(fe)  0.004 0.050 0.09 99% 0.004 0.050 0.09 
MTB(t+1) W&G Yes SP SPxRD MTB(t) R&D sales year(fe)  0.009 0.050 0.18 98% 0.009 0.050 0.17 
ROA(t+1) B&S No SP SPxRD ROA(t) R&D risk adv year(fe) 0.344 0.246 1.40 95% 0.343 0.246 1.40 
ROA(t+1) H&K No SP SPxRD ROA(t) R&D risk adv year(fe) 0.398 0.251 1.59 95% 0.398 0.251 1.58 
ROA(t+1) H&R No SP SPxRD ROA(t) R&D risk adv year(fe) 0.353 0.244 1.44 95% 0.353 0.245 1.44 
ROA(t+1) W&G No SP SPxRD ROA(t) R&D risk adv year(fe) 0.405 0.255 1.59 95% 0.404 0.255 1.58 
ROA(t+1) B&S Yes SP ROA(t) R&D year(fe) -0.215 0.127 -1.69 90% -0.222 0.130 -1.71 
ROA(t+1) H&K Yes SP ROA(t) R&D year(fe) -0.267 0.121 -2.21 93% -0.269 0.123 -2.19 
ROA(t+1) H&R Yes SP ROA(t) R&D year(fe) -0.211 0.128 -1.65 90% -0.218 0.131 -1.66 
ROA(t+1) W&G Yes SP ROA(t) R&D year(fe) -0.236 0.118 -1.99 91% -0.241 0.122 -1.98 
MTB(t+1) All No SP(W&G) MTB(t) R&D risk adv  year(fe) 0.076 0.022 3.44 34% 0.084 0.029 2.89 
MTB(t+1) All Yes SP(H&K) SPxRD MTB(t) R&D sales year(fe)  0.016 0.051 0.31 90% 0.015 0.051 0.29 
ROA(t+1) All No SP(W&G) SPxRD ROA(t) R&D risk adv year(fe) 0.405 0.255 1.59 50% 0.401 0.253 1.58 








Appendix 1:  Attributes of Six Papers Used to Establish the Model Space 
Functional 
form 
Specification Seminal Paper DV IV Controls Main Findings 
Linear 
form  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽Θ𝑖𝑡−1
+  𝜀𝑖𝑡 










Hull and Rothenberg 
(2008) 
















SP dummy variable for 
being part of the KLD 
data in 1991-1996 
 
 
Weighted SP attributes 
as in Waddock and 




(ind. Adv. intensity) and 
innovation (R&D exp.)   
Debt/total assets, 
Total sales, Total 
assets, Number of 
employees 
 





Assets, sales, risk,  
 
SP positively and 
significantly associated 
with ROA & ROS. 
 
 
No effect of SP on FP 




SP affects FP in low-
innovation firms and in 
industries with little 
differentiation 
Linear 
with FE at 
firm  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽Θ𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
+  𝑢𝑖 
Zhao and Murrell (2016) 
replication study of 
Waddock and Graves 
(1997) 
ROA, ROE, ROS, 
Tobin’s q, MTB, 
MVA 
Weighted SP attributes 
as in Waddock and 
Graves (1997) 
Debt/total assets, 
Total sales, Total 
assets, Number of 
employees 
Positive and significant 
effect of SP on FP only 




𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 
𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽Θ𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Barnett and Salomon 
(2012) Model 1 and 2 
 
 
ROA, Net Income 
KLD score (the sum of 
strengths and weaknesses 
of 7 social performance 




Size, R&D intensity, 
Advertising intensity 







=  𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 +     𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡−1
2
+  𝛽Θ𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖 








𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 =  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽Θ𝑖𝑡−1
+ (𝜀𝑖𝑡) 
Also implied, but not tested, is 
a fully differenced model: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖𝑡−1
=  𝛽(𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1) +  𝛽(Θ𝑖𝑡
− Θ𝑖𝑡−1)      + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  







SM (empl. relations, 
diversity issues, product 
issues, community 
relations, and env issue) 




Sales, net income, 
risk, industry 
 
SM positively and 
significantly associated 
with MVA 









Appendix 2. Computational map to determine the model space to be mapped and the models to estimate (based on Figure 1). In total 3,200 
models. 
Outcome Predictor Function Estimate Controls X total  Outcome Predictor Function Estimate Controls X total 
ROA B&S Linear 
Between 
(OLS) 




IV x RD 
Between 
(OLS) 
Size (0,1) 2X 
 
MTB H&K Quadratic  





MTB H&K  
 








FE Time (0,1) 2X 
   
H&R 
  















    
R&D (0, 1) 2X 
      
R&D (1) 1X 
 
    
Risk (0, 1) 2X 
      
Risk (0, 1) 2X 
 
2X 4X 2X 1X  96 =1536  2X 4X 1X 1X  48 =384 
Outcome Predictor Function Estimate Controls X total  Outcome Predictor Function Estimate Controls X  
ROA B&S Linear 
Within 
(FE) 




IV x RD 
Within 
(FE) 
Size (0,1) 2X 
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The upper left quadrant illustrates the model space for linear and quadratic OLS models. The product of the control variables (96 combinations) with the DV (2), SP variables (4), 
functions (2) and OLS estimate (1) produces 1,536 models. The lower left quadrant depicts the model space for linear and quadratic FE models. The combinations of control 
variables are 64 because industry-FE are excluded. The upper right quadrant includes models with the moderation effect of RD only for linear OLS models. There are 48 models 
since R&D needs to be present in every model. The right lower quadrant includes FE models with the moderation effect of R&D.   
